By Arjen K. Lenstra, Eric R. Verheul (auth.), Mihir Bellare (eds.)

This booklet constitutes the refereed court cases of the twentieth Annual overseas Cryptology convention, CRYPTO 2000, held in Santa Barbara, CA, united states in August 2000. The 32 revised complete papers offered including one invited contribution have been conscientiously reviewed and chosen from one hundred twenty submissions. The papers are geared up in topical sections on XTR and NTRU, privateness for databases, safe dispensed computation, algebraic cryptosystems, message authentication, electronic signatures, cryptanalysis, traitor tracing and broadcast encryption, symmetric encryption, to devote or to not devote, protocols, and circulation ciphers and Boolean capabilities.

Show description

Read Online or Download Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO 2000: 20th Annual International Cryptology Conference Santa Barbara, California, USA, August 20–24, 2000 Proceedings PDF

Similar international_1 books

Plant Pathogenic Bacteria: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Plant Pathogenic Bacteria, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, Canada, July 23–27, 2000

Plant Pathogenic micro organism comprises symposia and examine papers awarded on the tenth foreign convention on Plant Pathogenic micro organism. The publication offers the entire textual content of twenty-two symposia papers that summarize the state of the art of the various features of phytobacteriology together with affliction keep an eye on, taxonomy, genetics of pathogenicity, virulence components, in addition to detection and analysis.

Computational Logistics: 5th International Conference, ICCL 2014, Valparaiso, Chile, September 24-26, 2014. Proceedings

This booklet constitutes the refereed complaints of the fifth overseas convention on Computational Logistics, ICCL 2014, held in Valparaiso, Chile, in September 2014. The eleven papers awarded during this quantity have been conscientiously reviewed and chosen for inclusion within the e-book. they're geared up in topical sections entitled: optimization of shipping difficulties; box terminal functions; simulation and environmental sustainability purposes.

Proceedings of International Symposium on the Qinghai-Xizang Plateau and Mountain Meteorology

During this continuing there are paperbounds provided by means of the members at a gathering held in Beijing, China, 20-24 March 1984, together with these at the following very important features on the subject of mountain meteorology: the sector commentary, the dynamic and thermal results of the mountains at the normal movement, the consequences received during the numerical versions with the large-scale topography, and the flow platforms at the Plateau.

Transport Deregulation: An International Movement

This booklet brings jointly a global choice of unique papers taking a look at the affects of the new liberalization measures within the shipping area. It features a variety of region reports which specialize in the deregulation of nations corresponding to Switzerland and Australia in addition to the wider eu point of view.

Additional info for Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO 2000: 20th Annual International Cryptology Conference Santa Barbara, California, USA, August 20–24, 2000 Proceedings

Example text

Such attacks have been studied on NTRU by Hoffstein and Silverman in [8] but they applied on the unpadded version of the cryptosystem. Choice of a Polynomial P . Let P ≡ xi1 + · · · + xin + h (xj1 + · · · xjm ) (mod q), ik , jl ∈ N. 3, in P is near 1, and preferably a little smaller, so that we can expect P to have no more than one collision. If there is no collision, there will be no decryption failure, and we will know we need to change P . We will have to try different P , till we found a suitable one.

The ID3 algorithm assumes that each attribute is categorical, that is containing discrete data only, in contrast to continuous data such as age, height etc. The principle of the ID3 algorithm is as follows: The tree is constructed top-down in a recursive fashion. At the root, each attribute is tested to determine how well it alone classifies the transactions. The “best” attribute (to be discussed below) is then chosen and we partition the remaining transactions by it. We then recursively call ID3 on each partition (which is a smaller database containing only the appropriate transactions and without the splitting attribute).

As before, we do not explicitely compute these probabilities, but we estimate the average number of collisions. When this number is near 1, it means that the n and m are correctly chosen. 1 Example Detailed Example of Case D In [7], it is claimed that the highest security level will be obtained with the set of parameters D. We now give an example that shows, with this set of parameters, that our attack can recover the secret key. Here is the private key (f, g) we have used: 502 501 500 499 498 497 496 495 494 493 492 f = −x +x +x −x −x +x −x −x −x −x −x 491 490 488 487 486 485 482 481 480 479 477 −x +x −x +x −x −x −x +x −x −x +x 474 472 471 470 468 467 466 464 463 462 475 +x +x −x +x +x −x +x +x −x +x +x 461 460 459 458 457 455 454 453 451 450 449 +x −x −x +x +x −x +x −x −x −x +x 448 447 446 445 444 443 442 441 440 439 438 +x +x +x +x −x −x +x +x +x −x +x 437 436 435 434 433 430 429 428 425 424 423 −x −x −x +x +x −x −x +x −x +x +x 422 421 420 418 417 416 415 414 412 411 409 −x −x −x −x −x −x +x −x +x −x −x 408 407 406 405 404 402 401 400 399 398 397 −x +x +x −x +x −x −x −x +x −x +x 28 ´ Eliane Jaulmes and Antoine Joux 396 394 393 391 390 389 388 387 386 385 384 +x −x +x −x +x +x +x −x −x +x +x 383 381 380 379 378 377 376 374 373 372 371 +x +x −x −x +x −x +x +x −x +x +x 370 369 368 367 366 365 364 363 362 361 360 +x −x +x −x +x −x +x −x −x +x −x 359 358 357 356 355 354 353 352 350 349 348 +x −x −x +x +x −x +x −x +x −x −x 346 345 344 343 342 341 340 339 338 337 336 −x −x +x −x −x +x −x −x −x +x +x 334 333 332 331 330 329 328 327 326 325 324 +x +x −x −x −x +x −x +x +x +x −x 323 322 321 320 319 318 317 316 315 313 311 +x −x +x −x −x +x +x +x −x −x −x 310 309 308 306 305 304 303 302 301 300 299 −x −x +x −x −x +x −x +x −x +x −x 298 297 294 293 292 291 290 288 287 286 285 −x −x +x −x −x −x −x −x +x −x −x 284 283 282 280 279 277 276 275 274 273 272 +x −x +x −x −x +x −x +x +x +x +x 271 270 269 268 267 266 264 263 262 261 260 −x +x −x +x −x −x +x +x −x +x −x 259 257 256 255 254 253 252 251 249 248 247 +x −x +x −x −x +x +x +x +x +x −x 246 245 243 242 240 238 237 236 234 233 232 +x −x +x −x +x +x −x −x +x −x −x 231 230 229 228 227 226 225 223 222 221 220 +x −x +x −x −x +x −x +x +x −x +x 219 218 217 215 214 213 212 210 209 208 207 +x +x −x −x −x +x −x +x −x +x +x 206 205 203 202 201 200 199 198 197 196 195 −x −x +x +x −x −x +x +x −x +x +x 194 193 192 191 190 188 187 186 185 184 183 −x +x +x +x +x +x +x −x +x −x +x 182 181 180 179 178 177 176 175 174 173 172 +x +x +x −x −x +x −x +x +x −x +x 170 169 168 167 166 165 164 161 160 159 158 −x +x +x +x +x −x −x +x +x −x +x 155 154 152 151 150 149 148 147 145 142 141 −x +x +x +x −x +x +x +x −x −x +x 140 139 138 137 136 135 133 132 131 130 128 −x −x +x +x −x −x +x −x +x +x +x 127 126 125 124 123 121 120 118 116 115 114 +x −x +x +x +x −x +x +x −x +x −x 113 112 110 109 108 107 106 105 103 102 100 −x −x +x +x +x +x −x −x −x +x +x 99 98 96 95 94 93 92 91 90 89 88 87 +x +x +x +x −x −x −x +x −x −x −x −x 86 85 84 83 82 81 80 79 78 77 75 74 +x −x +x +x −x +x −x +x +x +x +x +x 73 72 71 69 68 67 66 65 64 63 62 60 −x −x −x −x −x −x +x +x +x +x +x −x 59 58 57 56 55 54 53 51 50 49 48 47 −x +x −x +x +x +x +x −x −x +x +x −x 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 +x +x +x −x −x +x +x −x −x +x −x +x 34 32 31 30 29 28 27 25 24 23 21 20 −x −x −x +x −x −x +x −x −x −x −x +x 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 −x +x −x −x −x −x +x +x −x −x +x −x 7 6 5 3 2 −x − x − x − x + x − 1 499 496 495 487 486 484 480 478 470 466 465 g = −x +x +x −x +x +x −x +x +x −x +x 462 461 460 451 446 431 428 421 415 412 411 −x +x +x +x −x −x −x +x +x +x −x 406 403 402 398 397 395 392 373 371 370 367 −x −x −x −x −x −x +x +x −x −x +x 366 364 359 355 352 351 349 347 340 339 338 +x −x −x −x +x +x +x +x +x +x +x 335 328 326 323 317 314 309 308 307 306 304 +x +x −x +x +x −x −x −x +x +x +x 303 302 299 295 292 291 289 288 283 281 280 −x −x −x −x −x +x +x +x +x +x +x 277 266 264 262 260 257 256 255 251 250 249 −x +x +x −x −x −x +x −x −x −x −x 236 235 233 232 230 227 226 224 217 216 215 −x −x +x −x +x +x +x −x +x +x −x 212 206 205 203 196 194 193 190 185 183 177 −x +x −x +x +x −x +x +x +x −x −x 172 169 168 165 163 157 156 155 138 136 135 −x −x −x +x −x −x +x +x −x +x −x 134 132 131 123 119 117 111 102 99 97 95 +x +x −x −x +x −x −x −x −x +x −x 94 92 91 89 88 86 84 83 78 76 66 60 −x +x +x −x −x −x +x +x −x +x −x +x 52 51 47 46 36 35 34 30 28 16 −x +x −x +x −x −x −x +x +x +x +1 We do not give here values of Fp , Fq or of the public key h since they are big and they can easily be computed from f and g.

Download PDF sample

Rated 4.68 of 5 – based on 5 votes